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1. Introduction. 
Although many empirical studies have examined the effect of labour market 
characteristics, macroeconomic fluctuations and workplace-level factors on strike 
activity, much less is known about industry-level determinants of industrial conflict, 
and in particular the role of product market competition. This paper tries to fill this 
gap. I examine the effect of competition on strikes using evidence from a unique natural 
experiment of policy reform, the introduction of cartel law in the UK in the late 
1950s. My analysis takes advantage of the exogeneity of cartel policy and the fact 
that this affected different industries to varying degrees. The results, using a panel 
data set of 50 industries over a 27-year period, both before and after the 
implementation of cartel policy, reveal a strong positive effect of the intensification 
of competition caused by the abolition of cartels on the number of strikes as well as 
on the working days lost as a result of strikes. I also propose an interpretation of these 
findings with reference to theoretical models of bargaining with asymmetric 
information. 
 The existing literature offers little and contradictory evidence regarding the 
impact of competition on industrial conflict. Geroski et al. (1982) and Geroski and 
Knight (1983) have found a positive association of market concentration with strike 
frequency but a negative one with strike duration in the UK. For the USA, in 
contrast, Tracy (1986, 1987) reports a positive effect of concentration on strike 
probabilities and no effect on duration, whereas Abowd and Tracy (1989) have found 
no link of strike incidence with concentration and a negative one with import 
penetration. Brandl and Traxler (2010) present evidence of a negative association of 
economic openness (the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) with 
working days lost due to stoppages for a panel of 19 OECD countries, which disappears 
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when they include year dummies in their regression. These results are not only 
ambiguous but also difficult to interpret because of methodological limitations and 
the lack of a clear theoretical foundation. The main problem is that variables such as 
concentration or imports are endogenous. Furthermore, concentration may be even 
positively rather than negatively related to the intensity of competition (Sutton 1991, 
Symeonidis 2000, 2002), whereas economic integration may also have a market 
expansion effect or otherwise involve more than just an intensification of competitive 
conduct. A further drawback is the lack of a convincing theoretical justification in 
the literature for a role of product market competition in industrial conflict other 
than as a determinant of the level of firm profitability, even though profitability is 
often included as a separate regressor in empirical models of strike activity. 
 Few studies of industrial action in Britain have made use of panel data, and 
to the best of my knowledge none exists for the time period I consider here. Time-
series studies have obtained ambiguous results for standard explanatory variables 
such as the unemployment rate, the inflation rate or profitability (Pencavel 1970, 
Knight 1972, Shorey 1977). Cross-section analyses, including Shorey (1976) and 
Smith et al. (1978), have found little evidence of a consistent effect of variables such 
as unemployment or unionisation on inter-industry differences in strike intensity. 
Perhaps the most consistent finding across time-series studies is a negative effect of 
past wage increases on strike frequency. However, cross-section results have often 
revealed a positive association between earnings and industrial conflict. In this paper 
I confirm that many of these factors do not contribute much to explaining the 
evolution of strike incidence in British industries during the period examined, once 
one controls for product market competition as well as industry and time effects. 
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 Strikes will always make headlines because they can cause serious disruption 
and economic loss, despite the decline in industrial conflict in many countries over 
the past few decades. Airport workers in several European countries have regularly 
been on strike in recent years, and industrial action by French transport workers 
caused considerable disruption during the European football championship in the 
summer of 2016. An Indian one-day general strike in September 2016 was called 
“the biggest industrial action in human history” by the country’s unions and several 
international media. The number of stoppages in China increased tenfold between 2011 
and 2015 according to the China Labour Bulletin, a non-governmental organisation 
based in Hong Kong that promotes workers’ rights in China, and was still on the rise in 
the first half of 2016. In December 2016 some relatively minor disputes in Britain, 
affecting railways and postal services, and coming after industrial action by teachers 
and junior doctors earlier in the year, were somewhat hastily dubbed “the Christmas 
of discontent” by the media. Although it is perhaps too early to assess the long-term 
significance of these events, they have also come as a reminder that there are still 
many unanswered questions in the literature on industrial disputes. 
In fact, this literature presents a paradox. There are several different theories 
of the causes of conflict, but none has obtained strong empirical support (see the 
surveys and/or critical discussions by Kennan 1986, Kaufman 1992, Card 1990, 
Mumford 1993, Ingram et al. 1993, Franzosi 1989, and Cramton and Tracy 2003, 
among others). Moreover, some of the most sophisticated and widely accepted 
theoretical models, such as those based on the existence of asymmetric information 
between employers and unions, seem to have difficulty explaining one of the most 
remarkable and well documented facts about industrial disputes: the large 
differences in strike activity across industries, time periods and countries (described, 
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among others, by Kerr and Siegel 1954, Durcan et al. 1983, Smith et al. 1978, 
Kaufman 1982, Rimlinger 1959, van der Velden et al. 2007, and Brandl and Traxler 
2010). No attempt will be made to fully resolve these issues in the present research. 
Differences in strike activity across British industries and over time will be simply 
controlled for using a full set of industry and year dummies. However, I will argue 
that the estimated strong positive effect of product market competition on industrial 
disputes provides support for the asymmetric information model of strikes, thus 
strengthening the case for economic theories of rational bargaining as compared to 
alternative economic models or behavioural, political and organisational approaches. 
 
2. Competition in British industry. 
Explicit restrictive agreements among firms were widespread in British industry in the 
mid-1950s: nearly half of manufacturing and many services industries were subject to 
price-fixing. The agreements were not enforceable at law, but they were not illegal. 
Most of them provided for minimum or fixed producer prices. There were generally no 
restrictions on longer-term decisions such as investment in capacity, advertising or 
R&D expenditure. A description of the institutional changes and the evolution of 
competition from the 1950s to the early 1970s and a detailed survey of restrictive 
agreements across all British manufacturing industries can be found in Symeonidis 
(2002). Here I summarise the evidence and I describe the construction of the 
competition data for this paper. 
The 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act required the registration of 
restrictive agreements, including verbal or even implied arrangements, on goods. 
Registered agreements should be abandoned, unless they were either successfully 
defended by the parties in the newly created Restrictive Practices Court as producing 
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benefits that outweighed the presumed detriment or cleared by the Registrar of 
Restrictive Trading Agreements as not significantly affecting competition. Because the 
attitude of the Court could not be known until the first cases had been heard, the 
large majority of industries registered their agreements rather than dropping or 
secretly continuing them. The first agreements came before the Court in 1959 and 
were struck down. This induced most industries to voluntarily abandon their 
agreements rather than incur the costs of a Court case with little hope of success.  
Were the agreements effective? This depended on two factors: the extent to 
which the parties themselves conformed to them and the extent of competition from 
outside firms, domestic or foreign. Evidence from the registered agreements, several 
industry reports published by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission 
during the 1950s, the Political and Economic Planning (1957) survey of industrial 
trade associations and a large number of case studies discussed in Swann et al. 
(1973, 1974) suggests that in most industries the agreements had been operated 
effectively prior to cancellation, the parties typically accounted for a large fraction of 
the market and contained the largest and best-known domestic firms, and outside 
competition was usually weak. For instance, Swann et al. report cartel market shares 
of 90% or higher in about two thirds of the 40 industries they examine, and 75% or 
higher in all but two cases. Competition from imports was often limited as a result of 
tariffs and quantitative controls, differing technical standards, transport costs or 
international restrictive agreements. Finally, the legality of the agreements and the 
institutional role of the trade associations that operated them had facilitated the 
coordination, monitoring and enforcement of collusion. 
To what extent did collusion break down following the abolition of cartels? 
Evidence from various sources indicates that price competition intensified after 1958 in 
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many industries. However, in many others, agreements to exchange information on 
prices, price changes and so on replaced the former explicit collusive arrangements, and 
price competition emerged only after these information agreements were abandoned in 
the mid-1960s, following adverse decisions of the Restrictive Practices Court. Price 
wars occurred in a number of previously collusive industries in the second half of the 
1960s, and the final blow came with the provisions of the 1968 Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act regarding information agreements. In many industries, therefore, 
competition emerged more than a decade after the introduction of the 1956 legislation. 
Overall, sooner or later the large majority of industries with collusive agreements in the 
1950s did experience a breakdown of collusion as a result of the 1956 Act.  
Although my main source of information on competition are the agreements 
registered under the 1956 Act, I also use other sources to identify unregistered 
agreements, including the industry reports of the Monopolies Commission, the 1955 
Monopolies Commission report on collective discrimination, the 1949 report of the 
Lloyds’ Committee on resale price maintenance, industry studies contained in Burn 
(1958) and Hart et al. (1973), the Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, and 
the Political and Economic Planning (1957) survey of trade associations (including 
unpublished background material for this survey). The use of a diverse range of sources 
guarantees that any measurement error caused by ineffective agreements or unknown 
cases of collusion in the data is very small.  
My data set for this paper is a panel of 50 industries or industry groups 
covering all economic activity in Britain. The industry definitions are those used in 
the official strike statistics. My approach to modelling the effect of competition is 
based on calculating the extent to which any given industry in the panel was affected 
by the 1956 Act. Several industries were not affected at all: some had always been 
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competitive, others were under public ownership, and a few had collusive 
agreements which continued throughout the period under study. The majority of 
industries were affected to a larger or smaller extent, and for each of these I have 
calculated the fraction of sales revenue covered by products which were subject to 
significant restrictive agreements abandoned as a result of the 1956 cartel law. Not all 
agreements had an impact on competition, so I have taken the types of restrictions 
into account when determining the extent to which any given industry was collusive in 
the 1950s and I have excluded cases where the effect of the restrictions on prices would 
have been minimal. The geographical coverage of each agreement was also taken into 
account. A variable, CHANGE, was then defined, which takes values between 0 and 
1 according to the fraction of each industry which was affected by the legislation. 
My method of constructing CHANGE is illustrated in the Appendix by way of a few 
examples.1 The main limitation of CHANGE is that it does not capture variations in the 
“degree of collusion” across industries, since this cannot be determined from the 
available information. Note that to the extent that any measurement error in CHANGE is 
not correlated with industry characteristics affecting strike intensity, my econometric 
results may only understate somewhat the magnitude of the effect of competition on 
industrial action. The mean of CHANGE across the 50 industries in my data set is 0.27 
and its standard deviation 0.27. Excluding the 18 industries for which it takes the value 
0 (no significant agreements cancelled), the mean of CHANGE is 0.43, the standard 
deviation 0.23, the minimum 0.10 and the maximum 0.80. 
The panel spans 27 years, from 1949 to 1975. Official data on strike activity by 
industry are only available since 1949. In any case, the British economy only gradually 
                                                 
1 Further details, for each industry in the sample, are provided in the Additional Materials 
posted on the EER website. 
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emerged from wartime controls, and these would have affected both product market 
competition and strike activity before 1949. Furthermore, a significant further change in 
cartel policy occurred in the UK in the mid-1970s, when the 1976 Restrictive Practices 
Act led to the breakdown of restrictive agreements in services. I have chosen 1975 as 
the last year in my panel because it seemed preferable to avoid the additional 
complication of a change in competition regime other than the 1956 Act affecting a 
number of industries in the data set. The period 1949-1975 was characterised by 
considerable stability in labour market institutions and policy, except for the operation 
of prices and incomes policy between 1965 and the early 1970s. There was also 
macroeconomic stability for most of the period, except for an upward trend in inflation 
after the late 1960s and the 1973-1975 recession. All in all, the 1956 cartel legislation 
stands out as one of the major exogenous influences on the economic environment 
facing British industries during the period under study. 
 
3. Endogenous variables and descriptive statistics. 
Official statistics for the number of stoppages beginning in each year and the number 
of working days lost as a result of stoppages in progress during each year in about 50 
individual industries or industry groups covering the whole British economy have 
been published since 1949 in the Ministry of Labour Gazette and its successors, the 
Employment and Productivity Gazette and the Department of Employment Gazette. 
For the 1950s and most of the 1960s these are the only available data on stoppages in 
UK industries. Workplace-level data are not available before the 1980s. The number of 
industries covered each year ranges from 48 to 50 because of minor changes in industry 
definitions and the occasional splitting or merging of categories. It was therefore 
sometimes necessary to make small adjustments to the figures to ensure comparability 
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over time. Two thirds of the industries are in manufacturing, and more than four 
fifths were fully or largely under private ownership during the period examined. 
Some of the industry definitions are broad, whereas others are finer. This 
could potentially raise the concern that certain large industry groups are given the 
same weight in the analysis as some small individual industries. However, there are 
at least two factors that help alleviate this concern, both of which indicate that the 
classification is generally well suited for the analysis of strikes. First, most 
definitions coincide with those used by Bain and Price (1980) to study unionisation, 
which suggests that union coverage and organisation was a significant criterion in 
defining the industry categories for the stoppage data, as seems appropriate. Second, 
the level of aggregation is often lower for strike-prone than for other sectors. 
The data are for stoppages that arise primarily over terms and conditions of 
employment. Strikes for political reasons, such as those called in opposition to the 
1971 Industrial Relations Act, are excluded. No distinction is made between strikes 
and lockouts. However, since the vast majority of these stoppages are strikes, I will 
use the two terms interchangeably. Stoppages involving fewer than 10 workers or 
lasting less than one day are not recorded unless the aggregate number of working 
days lost is higher than 100. This implies that in those few cases where figures for 
the number of strikes and the number of days lost for a certain industry and year are 
not reported in the Gazette, it is difficult to know whether these were very small or 
exactly zero. Note that the working days lost refer to the workplaces where stoppages 
took place – not in other workplaces, for instance through shortage of materials. About 
half of all stoppages and 80% of days lost during the period 1949-1975 were over 
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pay issues, with most of the rest concerning manning levels or dismissal and 
discipline (Durcan et al. 1983, Smith et al. 1978).2 
 My two measures of strike activity are standard and have been widely used in 
the previous literature. Although the number of stoppages can be influenced by very 
short strikes with little economic significance and the number of days lost can be 
influenced by even a single unusually long strike, the two measures together give an 
accurate account of the extent of industrial conflict in any given industry and year. 
For purposes of comparison and analysis it is useful to normalise them by dividing 
with the number of employees, so I will define STRIKES, the number of stoppages 
per 100,000 employees, and DAYS, the number of working days lost per 1000 
employees, following standard practice and using data on employees in employment 
for each industry and year from the Ministry of Labour Gazette and the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics. 
Even a casual look at the data reveals considerable variation in strike activity 
over time and across industries. For instance, the total number of stoppages in the 
UK varies between 1,339 in 1950 and 3,116 in 1969, and the total number of 
working days lost ranges from 1.39 million in 1950 to 23.9 million in 1972. These 
aggregate figures reflect an upward trend in both STRIKES and DAYS for much of 
the 27-year period, with a peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This can be seen 
in Table 1, which contains descriptive statistics for STRIKES and DAYS for five 
different sub-periods and also confirms that the sharp rise in the aggregate number 
of disputes and days lost in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s was not driven by a 
                                                 
2 Smith et al. (1978), who had access to unpublished data held at the UK Department of 
Employment, report cross-section regression results for the determinants of stoppage frequency 
in UK industries using averages for 1968-1973 both for all stoppages and for the subset of 
stoppages over pay issues. The results are very similar in the two cases. 
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few outlier industries. For instance, the median number of stoppages per 100,000 
employees across the 50 industries was six times larger, and the median number of 
working days lost per 1000 employees more than ten times larger, in 1971-1975 than 
in 1954-1958. 
Furthermore, almost half of all industrial action throughout this period was 
concentrated in four industries, which together accounted for only 5-10% of total 
employment: coal mining, motor vehicles and cycles, shipbuilding and marine 
engineering, and port and inland water transport (see also Durcan et al. 1983, Smith 
et al. 1978). The extent of variation in strike incidence across industries decreased 
after the mid-1960s for two main reasons: the relative decline of strike activity in 
coal mining and the spreading of conflict in several previously little-affected 
industries. However, the ranking of industries with respect to strike intensity 
remained relatively stable over the entire period. This implies that whatever the 
causes of the heterogeneity across industries and over time, this can be largely 
captured in a regression model by industry and time effects. Since the distributions 
of the number of stoppages and the number of days lost across industries are both 
highly skewed to the right – in a typical year, the former has a maximum value of 
several hundred and a median of less than 10, and the latter has a maximum of 
several hundred thousand and a median of less than 10,000 – I use logarithmic and 
other transformations of my endogenous variables in the econometric analysis of the 
next section. 
Note that strikes are rare events even in strike-prone industries and typically 
affect only a small fraction of workplaces in any given year. One could argue, however, 
that a change in a certain industry-level variable may affect the propensity of conflict in 
all or most workplaces even though this propensity is actually translated into stoppages 
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only at a minority of workplaces. A further implicit assumption of studies using data at 
the industry (or country) level is that the strike-affected workplaces have the same 
characteristics with regard to any explanatory variable as the average workplace in their 
industry (or country). This assumption is plausible with respect to CHANGE in the 
present context: the change of competition regime caused by the abolition of the British 
cartels affected the large majority of firms in the previously collusive industries. 
Descriptive statistics for strike activity in manufacturing industries are 
reported in Table 2. There are obvious benefits to using all the available information 
in the econometric analysis, especially since the sample is not large. On the other hand, 
a potential concern is that any effect of competition on industrial action might have 
been qualitatively or quantitatively different in manufacturing than in the rest of the 
economy during the period examined. For instance, nearly all British industries fully 
or largely under public ownership during this period were outside manufacturing. 
Not only were publicly owned firms likely to be facing softer financial constraints 
than privately owned ones, but also bargaining structures differed: local or plant-
level decentralised bargaining was much more prevalent in the private than in the 
public sector. Furthermore, as pointed out in the previous section, the 1956 cartel 
law only applied to the production of goods. In fact, only 5 out of the 34 
manufacturing industries in the panel were totally unaffected by cartel policy, 
whereas CHANGE is equal to zero for 13 out of 16 non-manufacturing industries, 
including those under public ownership. In short, the manufacturing sub-sample has 
a more symmetric distribution of CHANGE than the full sample and also excludes 
public-sector industries where the large majority of employees were covered by 
national collective agreements only. 
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However, a comparison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals only small differences in 
the evolution of STRIKES and DAYS between the full sample and the manufacturing 
sub-sample. Strike intensity increased sharply during the 1960s and early 1970s in 
manufacturing as in the British economy as a whole, and this increase was only 
slightly greater in manufacturing than in the rest of the economy – a difference 
which is not driven by outliers, since it is more evident in the median than the mean 
of STRIKES and DAYS, and is only partly explained by the relative decline of 
conflict in coal mining after a peak in the late 1950s. The lower standard deviations 
in Table 2 relative to Table 1 are partly due to the exclusion of two strike-intensive 
industries, port and inland water transport and coal mining, from Table 2. 
 Table 3 reports correlation coefficients between CHANGE, lnSTRIKES and 
lnDAYS for five sub-periods. I split the ten years in the data set before the 
implementation of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act into two sub-periods, 
1949-1953 and 1954-1958, in order to also check whether the time trend in strike 
activity before the implementation of the cartel law was significantly different in 
industries with higher value of CHANGE than in those with lower value of 
CHANGE. I also consider three sub-periods after 1958 so as to distinguish between 
short-run and long-run effects of cartel policy: 1959-1964, 1965-1970 and 1971-1975. 
The exact choice of years for defining these sub-periods has very little effect on the 
overall pattern of results shown in Table 3. Note that the sign of any one of these 
correlation coefficients is not informative with respect to the competition-strike 
intensity relationship, since CHANGE may be correlated with unobserved industry 
characteristics that affect strike activity. For instance, only one of the four most strike-
prone industries mentioned above was significantly affected by the 1956 cartel law, yet 
this does not tell us very much about the link between competition and strike propensity 
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– other factors, economic and institutional, were probably responsible for the high level 
of conflict in these industries (Durcan et al. 1983). What is far more important is the 
way the correlations change over time. 
It can be seen that the correlation coefficients of CHANGE with lnSTRIKES and 
lnDAYS for the full sample are both slightly negative in the 1950s. For instance, in 
1954-1958, the period immediately preceding the implementation of the 1956 Act, they 
are –0.046 and –0.090, respectively. However, they both turn positive in the 1960s and 
even more so in the 1970s: in 1971-1975 the corresponding values are 0.206 and 0.123. 
In other words, industries which experienced more extensively a change in competition 
regime as a result of the 1956 Act tended to be slightly less strike-prone in the 1950s 
than industries which were less affected by the legislation, but this association 
completely reversed in the 1960s and 1970s. This reversal is a strong indication that 
the intensification of product market competition after the breakdown of cartels 
caused an increase in strike activity in the short run as well as in the long run. 
 It can also be seen from Table 3 that the negative correlation of CHANGE with 
lnSTRIKES and lnDAYS in the 1950s was stronger for manufacturing than for the entire 
economy. However, what is more significant is that the correlation coefficients for 
manufacturing and for the whole economy change in a similar way over time, and they 
all eventually become positive in the 1960s. Note that in the early 1970s there was a 
slight reversal of the trend for lnDAYS, although not for lnSTRIKES, in 
manufacturing, a pattern not observed in the full sample. Still, the magnitude of the 
overall change in the correlation coefficients between the 1950s and the 1970s is similar 
in manufacturing and the economy as a whole. Thus the evidence from the descriptive 
statistics is that manufacturing was not significantly different from the rest of the 
economy with respect to the effect of competition on industrial action. 
15 
 
 A potential objection is that different industries may have been subject to 
different time trends in strike activity during the 1950s, which persisted in later 
years, so that the link between CHANGE and the evolution of strike intensity that we 
observe in the data may be to some extent due to the continuation of these trends 
rather than indicate an effect of competition. However, a comparison of 1949-1953 
with 1954-1958 shows that this is not the case. For lnSTRIKES the correlation with 
CHANGE actually becomes more negative in the later sub-period, whereas for 
lnDAYS it becomes less negative, and in both cases the change is small relative to 
the increase in both correlation coefficients after 1958. In short, there is no evidence 
of a link between CHANGE and the evolution of strike activity in the 1950s, a time 
when the British cartels were still in place. It therefore seems safe to conclude that 
any association between CHANGE and the evolution of lnSTRIKES and lnDAYS 
after 1958 is not biased by any pre-existing trend differentials across industries.3 
 
4. Econometric model and results. 
My econometric approach in this paper is a variation on the difference-in-differences 
methodology, which consists in comparing the difference between the average change 
in the variable of interest in an experimental group and the average change in the same 
variable in a control group. Instead of two distinct groups, however, what we have in the 
present case is a continuum of industries characterised by the extent to which they were 
affected by the 1956 cartel law, including a considerable number which were not 
affected at all. The specifications used are panel data models with individual-specific 
(industry) effects. This allows me to control for unobserved industry characteristics 
                                                 
3 Further evidence on the evolution of lnSTRIKES and lnDAYS over time for three groups of 
industries, according to the value of the variable CHANGE, is provided in a series of graphs in 
the Additional Materials posted on the EER website. 
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which may be important for strike activity and are relatively stable over time. Year 
dummies will also be included among the regressors to control for economy-wide 
factors that may have influenced the evolution of industrial disputes during the 
period examined. For instance, the increasing unwillingness of British governments 
to become involved in collective bargaining through the operation of official dispute 
resolution after the late 1950s (Durcan et al. 1983) and the gradual rise in the 
inflation rate and the practice of incomes policy after the mid-1960s may help 
explain the two biggest jumps in strike activity during this period, the first in 1960 
and the second in 1968. 
To the extent that there is a link between product market competition and 
industrial conflict, the progressive opening of the British economy after the mid-
1960s may have also been a factor. This effect, which is difficult to measure in a 
fully satisfactory way, should be partly picked up by the time dummies. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that changes in the extent of foreign competition are 
correlated with CHANGE, at least for the subset of manufacturing industries. As shown 
in Symeonidis (2003), cartelisation was not correlated with the intensity of foreign 
competition in the 1950s. Moreover, Kitchin (1976) provides estimates of effective 
tariff protection for 1963 and 1968 for manufacturing industries. Effective protection 
increased in 6 out of 12 industries or sectors that had been mostly collusive in the 1950s 
and therefore experienced a change of competition regime during the 1960s, and 
decreased in the other 6. For industries or sectors that had been mostly competitive and 
were therefore not much affected by cartel policy, the respective numbers are 8 and 10. 
Tariff protection changes before 1963 were far less pronounced. It seems clear therefore 
that, for manufacturing at least, the estimated effect of the abolition of cartels in my 
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regressions is unlikely to be biased because of the lack of a better control for the extent 
of foreign competition.  
On the other hand, CHANGE might be positively correlated with foreign 
competition in the full sample, since most services industries were both relatively 
immune from imports and little affected by the 1956 cartel law. One response to this 
concern is to estimate the model for the full sample as well as for the manufacturing 
sub-sample and check whether the results differ in the two cases. In fact, the results for 
manufacturing constitute a more general robustness test in the present context for the 
reasons discussed in the previous section. In addition, I will check below whether my 
results change when the import penetration ratio is included among the regressors. 
Although import penetration cannot capture the effect of the mere threat of imports, 
may not reflect competitive pressure if imported goods are partly complementary to 
domestic products, is effectively only available for manufacturing industries and is 
clearly endogenous, this approach could provide additional reassurance that the main 
results of interest are not biased by any potential correlation between CHANGE and 
the intensity of foreign competition.4 
My benchmark specification for STRIKES, the number of stoppages per 
100,000 employees, is: 
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4 An alternative candidate measure of the intensity of foreign competition is the rate of effective 
protection. However, estimates of effective rates of protection are available for only a few of the 
years in my sample. 
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In these specifications, all industry-year pairs for which the number of stoppages 
and that of days lost are not recorded in the official statistics, for the reasons 
discussed in the previous section, were dropped from the sample. An alternative 
approach is to assume that both STRIKES and DAYS are equal to zero when their 
values are not reported. A complication with this approach is that a logarithmic 
transformation cannot be used for a variable that takes values of zero. Taking the 
cube root is sometimes regarded as a second-best option in such cases, since the 
distribution of the cube root has broadly similar properties to that of the logarithm 
when the original variable is highly skewed to the right. I therefore define 
root3STRIKES and root3DAYS, the cube roots of STRIKES and DAYS, respectively. 
The correlation coefficient between lnSTRIKES and root3STRIKES (for non-zero 
values) is 0.94 and that between lnDAYS and root3DAYS is 0.91. 
 The variables CHANGE5964, CHANGE6570 and CHANGE7175 are 
measures of the competition effect on strike activity in different periods. The 
benchmark period for interpreting the coefficients on these variables is 1949-1958, a 
time when the British cartels where still in place. Recall that CHANGE takes a single 
value between 0 and 1 for each industry in the sample. CHANGE5964 is equal to 
CHANGE for all years between 1959 and 1964 and zero otherwise. Thus the 
coefficient on CHANGE5964 is a measure of the impact of cartel policy during the 
first six years of its implementation. Similarly, CHANGE6570 is equal to CHANGE 
for all years from 1965 to 1970 and zero otherwise, and measures the medium-term 
impact of the abolition of cartels. Finally CHANGE7175 is equal to CHANGE for all 
years between 1971 and 1975 and zero otherwise, and is a measure of the long-run 
effect of competition. Recall that although British industries started cancelling their 
collusive agreements in 1959, the process took many years to complete and in 
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several cases competition did not emerge until after the mid-1960s. Although the 
division of the overall period 1959-1975 that I apply here may seem arbitrary, the 
econometric results are not much affected by small variations in the sub-periods 
used, and some division of this kind is necessary for analysing the timing of the 
effects of competition. 
 The control variables include the fraction of unionised employees, UNION; the 
logarithm of the number of employees in employment, lnEMPLOYEES; and the 
unemployment rate, UNEMPLOYMENT. All three are measured at the industry 
level. Data on union density were taken from Bain and Price (1980), on employment 
and unemployment from the Ministry of Labour Gazette and the Annual Abstract of 
Statistics. Union density, which is available either for the same industry definitions 
as the stoppage data or sometimes at a slightly higher level of aggregation, is a 
measure of employees’ ability to organise and carry out effective strikes. I use the 
lagged value of union density to mitigate any potential endogeneity concerns. The 
number of employees can be seen as a measure of productive activity, and therefore 
of the cost of a breakdown in negotiations for employers, following an influential 
theoretical argument that relates strike incidence to the joint costs of striking (Reder 
and Neumann 1980, McConnell 1990); alternatively, it could be a measure of the 
cost to employers of accepting a wage rise. The former interpretation would suggest 
a negative effect on strike incidence, the latter a positive one, and it is not clear 
which, if any, of these might dominate. The unemployment rate – defined here as the 
number of employees out of work who were previously employed in the industry in 
question as a fraction of the total number of employed and unemployed – has been 
widely used in previous studies as an inverse measure of the bargaining power of 
unions or as an index of the cost of striking for employees. Note that the inclusion of 
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these variables in the regressions also serves as a control against potential omitted 
variable bias, if, for instance, collusion in the 1950s was more prevalent in declining 
or more unionised industries. The list of control variables is not very long because of 
data limitations, although three more variables – industry profitability, import 
penetration and the inflation rate – will be introduced in robustness checks below. 
However, the inclusion of a full set of industry and year dummies helps to control 
for a range of macroeconomic, industry-specific, institutional and political factors in 
these regressions. 
 I do not include a wage variable in my specifications. One reason is that the 
data set is not suited to modelling wage effects on strike activity. The data are 
industry-level and annual, so contemporaneous wages would clearly be endogenous 
and lagged industry wages largely irrelevant. More generally, I estimate here a 
reduced-form model and focus on long-term exogenous determinants of trends in 
strike activity rather than short-run fluctuations or micro-level heterogeneity. In this 
context wages are best seen as another outcome of collective bargaining, along with 
stoppages, rather than as a cause of disputes. In any case, the average industry wage 
is not correlated with CHANGE in these data. In my previous work on the effects of 
the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, using both cross-section and panel data for 
manufacturing industries at the three-digit level of aggregation, I have found no 
evidence of any effect of cartels or cartel policy on average wages and earnings 
(Symeonidis 2008, 2015). Thus the estimated effect of competition on strikes in the 
present work is unlikely to be biased because of the omission of a measure of 
earnings from the regressions. 
Note that the above specifications are not meant to tell us anything about the 
level of strike intensity across industries in any given year, since industry effects are 
21 
 
included among the regressors. My approach examines the evolution of the number of 
strikes and days lost across industries, and seeks to identify the extent to which this 
evolution was influenced by the change in competitive conditions facing firms in a wide 
range of industries. 
A potential concern is that CHANGE might be endogenous. In other words, 
any differences in the evolution of strike intensity after 1958 across industries with 
different values of CHANGE might be partly driven by unobserved characteristics 
that differ across industries and are correlated with CHANGE rather than the 1956 
law. It is difficult to find suitable instruments for CHANGE. However, there are 
several good reasons to believe that this is not a serious problem in the present 
context. First, Table 3 suggests that the difference in the evolution of strike intensity 
during the 1950s between industries which were subsequently significantly affected 
by cartel policy and those not much affected is minimal. This will be confirmed by 
the econometric results below. Therefore the comparison of different industries after 
1958 will not be biased by any pre-existing trend differentials. Second, recall that a 
low or zero value of CHANGE can occur either because an industry was mostly or 
fully competitive throughout the period under study, as was the case for several 
manufacturing and a few non-manufacturing industries, or because it was collusive 
or under public ownership and not significantly affected by the 1956 legislation, as 
was the case for many services industries. It is very difficult to think of unobserved 
industry characteristics which might be positively associated with collusion in one 
set of industries, competition in another set of industries and public ownership in 
still another set of industries. Third, even if CHANGE were influenced by 
unobserved variables correlated with strike activity and not included in the model, 
these variables would be more likely to be part of the industry-specific effects than 
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of the error term, since the large majority of restrictive agreements were in operation 
for many years before the introduction of the 1956 law. Any such correlations 
between the industry-specific effects and the endogenous variables would not bias 
the regression coefficients in my fixed effects specifications. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the results for STRIKES and DAYS, respectively, using a 
fixed effects model with cluster-robust standard errors. The random effects model is 
clearly rejected for STRIKES but not so clearly for DAYS. The two sets of results do not 
differ significantly, and I report here fixed effects estimates throughout for consistency 
and random effects estimates for some specifications to allow for a comparison. The 
Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data typically does not reject the null 
hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation, a result which is stronger for DAYS than for 
STRIKES. The absence of serial correlation may be partly due to the inclusion of time 
dummies among the regressors. As the test is somewhat ambiguous for STRIKES, all the 
standard errors reported are robust to heteroskedasticity as well as serial correlation. 
Alternative results obtained from a fixed effects model with AR(1) disturbances are 
presented for some specifications. 
The first column in Table 4 contains the results from my benchmark model for 
lnSTRIKES, whereas the second column presents estimates from a model with AR(1) 
disturbances. In the third column I add CHANGE4953, which is equal to CHANGE for 
all years between 1949 and 1953 and zero otherwise. Thus the benchmark period in 
this regression is 1954-1958, the last few years of cartelisation. My aim in doing this 
is twofold: first, to confirm the absence of a statistically significant association between 
CHANGE and lnSTRIKES before the implementation of cartel policy, and, second, to 
check the robustness of my results for the effect of competition on lnSTRIKES to a 
change in the benchmark period which could be relevant for several reasons. For 
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instance, although most British cartels were long-standing, the registration of 
agreements took place after 1956, so any measurement error in CHANGE may be 
lower for 1954-1958 than for 1949-1953.  
In the fourth column of Table 4 I restrict the sample to the 34 manufacturing 
industries and I also add a measure of industry profitability which is available for this 
group but not for most industries outside manufacturing. In particular, PROFIT is the 
rate of return on net assets (i.e. gross trading profit plus dividends and interest received 
plus other income minus depreciation divided by total net assets), computed from 
aggregated data for quoted UK companies reported in Goudie and Meeks (1986). 
Although the rate of return is an endogenous variable and the coefficient on PROFIT 
may be therefore interpreted as a correlation coefficient, its inclusion in the model is 
meant to confirm that any effect of product market competition on strike activity works 
independently of the level of profitability. The fifth column in Table 4 introduces import 
penetration, IMPORT, as an additional regressor. Note that IMPORT, which is defined 
as the ratio of imports to total sales by domestic firms and can be constructed only for 
manufacturing industries because of data limitations, is an endogenous variable and its 
inclusion in the model only serves to provide additional reassurance of lack of bias in 
the estimated effect of CHANGE on strike intensity.5  
                                                 
5 I follow Hughes and Thirlwall (1977) in using the ratio of imports to total sales by domestic 
firms, I/S, as my measure of import penetration rather than an alternative measure, the ratio of 
imports to total sales in the domestic market (i.e. total sales by domestic firms plus imports 
minus exports), I/(S + I – X). Unlike this alternative measure, I/S is not affected by a change in 
X when I and S remain constant – for instance, by a redirection of a part of domestic output into 
exports. In any case, the results using I/(S + I – X) are very similar. The data on the value of 
imports and sales revenue of UK firms were obtained from the Annual Abstract of Statistics, the 
Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom, Overseas Trade Analysed in Terms of 
Industries (covering the years 1970 to 1975), the Historical Record of the Census of Production 
1907 to 1970, and the annual Censuses of Production from 1970 to 1975. Because of gaps in the 
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Results are also presented in the sixth column of Table 4 for a sample of 48 
industries, excluding port and inland water transport and coal mining, both of which 
were declining industries largely or wholly under public ownership and not affected 
by the 1956 cartel law. Coal mining was by far the most strike-prone British industry 
during much of the period under study, and one where industrial action has been 
declining in the 1960s, unlike most of the rest of the economy. Port and inland water 
transport was also one of the most-strike intensive industries and experienced a surge in 
strike action in the late 1960s and early 1970s far greater than that experienced by any 
other British industry. This regression is therefore intended as a robustness check when 
two industries that appear to somewhat stand out from the rest are excluded from the 
sample. As a further robustness check, lnSTRIKES is replaced by root3STRIKES in the 
last three columns of Table 4 and a slightly larger sample that includes observations 
with zero stoppages is used.  
Table 5 repeats the regressions of Table 4 with lnDAYS and root3DAYS as 
dependent variables, except that the model with AR(1) disturbances is now dropped in 
favour of a standard random effects model. 
There is clear evidence from all specifications and samples of a strong positive 
effect of product market competition on the number of stoppages as well as the number 
of working days lost both in the short run and in the long run. The effect is robust to 
changes in the endogenous variable, the sample used, the estimation method, the 
benchmark period and the control variables. The coefficients on CHANGE5964, 
CHANGE6570 and CHANGE7175 are almost everywhere statistically significant, 
typically at the 5% or 1% level. The estimated coefficients suggest that a change of 
                                                                                                                                               
annual sales data and difficulties in matching certain product definitions across the various 
sources, some of the import penetration figures are approximate. 
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competition regime that affects an additional 10% of an industry increases STRIKES by 
7-10% and DAYS by about 15%, on average, in that industry. Recall that the mean value 
of CHANGE across the 50 industries in my sample is 0.27. My estimates therefore 
suggest that the intensification of competition following the abolition of the British 
cartels caused, on average, a 20-30% increase in the number of stoppages and a much 
larger increase in the number of working days lost over the following 15 to 20 years, a 
substantial effect. For manufacturing, the mean value of CHANGE is 0.43, suggesting a 
30-40% increase in the number of stoppages as a result of cartel policy. Note that the 
exclusion of coal mining and port and inland water transport reduces only slightly some of 
the coefficients on CHANGE5964, CHANGE6570 and CHANGE7175, and the effect of 
competition on lnDAYS and lnSTRIKES remains statistically significant in the short run as 
well as in the long run. 
The coefficient on CHANGE4953 is statistically not significant, even at the 20% 
level, in all models except one, confirming that the positive association between 
competition and strike activity is a causal link, not a continuation of pre-existing 
differential trends. In one model where the coefficient on CHANGE4953 is statistically 
significant at the 10% level, it has the same sign as the coefficient on CHANGE5964. 
This suggests that even if industries with high value of CHANGE and industries with 
low value of CHANGE did have different trends until 1958 which are imprecisely 
estimated, these were, if anything, reversed after 1958. Of all the control variables, 
only union density appears to be positively associated with the number of stoppages 
and especially with the number of days lost, as expected. Unemployment does not 
seem to have an effect on strike activity. The result for profitability should be 
interpreted with some caution because PROFIT is only available at a slightly higher 
level of aggregation than the stoppage data (for about 20 different manufacturing 
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industry groups). On the other hand, it is unlikely that the lack of a more precise 
measure of profitability, or the omission of this variable in regressions with the full 
sample, causes any bias to the estimated effect of competition: I have shown 
elsewhere that the breakdown of the British cartels did not have a significant effect 
on industry profitability because market structure adjusted through mergers and exit 
of firms to restore average profitability in industries that experienced a change of 
competition regime (Symeonidis 2002, chapter 7). 
The coefficients on the year dummies (not reported) are large and statistically 
significant from 1960 and especially from 1968 onwards, in line with evidence reported 
in previous studies (for instance, Pencavel 1970) of an upward trend in strike activity 
during much of the period examined. In fact, dropping the time dummies reduces the R2 
by about one third for lnSTRIKES and by 10% for lnDAYS (and causes the coefficients 
on CHANGE5964, CHANGE6570 and CHANGE7175 to more than double). In further 
robustness checks for the full sample as well as for the manufacturing sub-sample 
reported in Table 6, I replace the year dummies with a linear time trend, TREND, and 
add the annual inflation rate, INFLATION, among the regressors. A linear time trend 
may impose too much structure on the data, so I do not regard this specification as 
an alternative to those used for Tables 4 and 5. Still, it may be useful as an 
additional robustness check which, unlike my benchmark model with year dummies, 
also allows me to explore potential links between industrial conflict and economy-
wide variables such as inflation. The coefficients and t-statistics on CHANGE5964, 
CHANGE6570 and CHANGE7175 are not significantly affected, there is once again 
strong evidence of an upward trend in strike activity over time, and the inflation rate 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on lnDAYS but not on lnSTRIKES. 
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Two R2’s are reported for each fixed effects regression in Tables 4-6. The 
difference between the two is a measure of the explanatory power of the industry 
effects, which is significant, especially for lnDAYS. This is consistent with the large and 
persistent differences in strike incidence across industries which are evident in the data. 
Note that the industry effects have a bigger impact than the time effects on working 
days lost, whereas the reverse is the case for the number of stoppages. Overall, the R2’s 
indicate that my explanatory variables, including the time and industry effects, explain 
about 85% of the variation in the number of stoppages and 65% of the variation in 
working days lost. 
 
5. Discussion. 
This research has examined the impact of product market competition on strike activity 
using evidence from a natural experiment of policy reform, the introduction of cartel 
law in Britain. Taking advantage of the fact that different industries were affected to 
varying degrees by cartel policy, and using panel data for a 27-year period before 
and after the implementation of the legislation, the analysis has established that both 
the number of stoppages and the number of working days lost as a result of stoppages 
increased significantly when competition intensified after the breakdown of cartels in 
the short run as well as in the long run. The estimated effect of competition is large, 
statistically significant and robust to variations in the endogenous variable, the sample 
and the econometric specification, unlike that of several other potential determinants of 
strikes which have often appeared in the previous literature. The effect is also robust to 
controlling for industry profitability, which in any case is not related to competition in 
these data. In other words, competition is not simply an inverse measure of average 
profits in the present case. 
28 
 
My econometric estimates suggest that the intensification of competition after 
the abolition of cartels caused, on average, about a 30% increase in the number of 
stoppages and an even larger increase in the number of working days lost over the 
following 15 to 20 years. Admittedly, this effect should be seen in context: this was a 
time when the average number of stoppages across British industries more than doubled 
and the average number of working days lost more than tripled. The relatively high 
level of industrial conflict in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s is not necessarily 
unusual if one adopts a long-term view of industrial relations spanning one or two 
centuries rather than a few decades only. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to ask whether 
product market competition can have an equally strong effect on strike activity at times 
and places characterised by more modest levels of conflict. The answer to this question 
may well be yes. This paper has shown that several other economic variables which are 
often regarded as standard determinants of strikes had a lot less impact on industrial 
action in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s than competition. There is no reason to 
expect that the ranking of economic factors according to their relative significance as 
determinants of strike incidence should be any different at other times or countries. 
What could be the economic mechanism driving my results? According to one 
hypothesis, competition reduces the ability of firms to pass on cost increases to prices 
and therefore makes them more resistant to union demands for improved pay or 
working conditions, thus triggering more and possibly longer strikes. Competition also 
puts pressure on firms to improve efficiency by internal reorganisation, which often 
goes against the interests or established practices of employees, creates insecurity and 
could result in more disputes. These arguments are theoretically unsatisfactory because 
a firm with market power may have a greater ability not only to meet union demands 
but also to resist them. And they also fail at a more fundamental level, since it is not 
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clear why rational firms and unions should be unable, under conditions of perfect 
information, to reach an agreement without incurring the costs of a strike, irrespective 
of the firm’s ability to pay and the union’s ability to appropriate – in other words, 
irrespective of the degree of competition in the product market. 
I propose here an interpretation that draws on theoretical models of bargaining 
with asymmetric information. There are a number of such models, but most are 
based on the idea that a union has worse information than a firm about the firm’s 
profitability and hence its ability to meet the union’s demands (see, for instance, Hayes 
1984, Hart 1989, Tracy 1987, and Booth and Cressy 1990; as well as Kennan 2008 
for a brief survey). The union may overestimate the firm’s profitability and demand 
too high a wage, whereas a highly profitable firm has an incentive to misrepresent 
its financial position and offer too low a wage. In this context, a strike is a 
mechanism that reveals the firm’s profitability to the union over time: the higher the 
profit, the more eager will the firm be to avoid a prolonged confrontation. Strikes 
must sometimes occur because if the union were never to strike, the firm would always 
offer the lowest possible wage. An obvious implication of these ideas is that strike 
incidence and duration increases with the degree of the union’s uncertainty about 
firm profitability and therefore with profit dispersion across firms in an industry or 
profit volatility of a firm over time, a prediction supported by empirical evidence 
(Tracy 1986, 1987). Note that unlike this unambiguous result, the predictions of 
asymmetric information models about the association between the level of 
profitability and strike activity are less clear – for instance, Tracy (1987) predicts a 
negative link, whereas Booth and Cressy (1990) a positive one. Therefore the fact 
that no clear correlation emerges between industry profitability and industrial action 
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in the present case is not inconsistent with my proposed interpretation (and is 
consistent with most previous empirical evidence). 
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that profit dispersion and 
volatility both increase with the intensity of competition. Raith (2003) has shown that 
an increase in market size or the degree of product substitutability, which reduces prices 
and may therefore be seen as an intensification of competition, raises the volatility of 
firms’ profits in a principal-agent model of oligopoly with free entry. Boone (2008a, 
2008b) has established that a common property of several different measures of 
competition across a range of theoretical models is that they involve an increase in 
“relative profit differences”, a measure closely related to profit dispersion across firms. 
Gaspar and Massa (2006) present evidence of a negative association between a firm’s 
market power and the idiosyncratic volatility of its stock returns in a large sample of 
firms over four decades. They examine the channels through which this effect works 
and find that competition raises both profit volatility and uncertainty about average 
profitability. Comin and Philippon (2006) have also provided evidence of a positive 
relationship between competition and firm-level volatility. 
In summary, my suggestion is that by increasing uncertainty, profit dispersion 
across firms and firm-level volatility, competition widens the informational asymmetry 
between firms and unions in bargaining, thus leading to more strikes. A formal test of 
this hypothesis would require firm-level data on strike activity and profitability, which 
are not available in the present context. Interestingly, in previous work (Symeonidis 
2015) I have found evidence of a negative effect of collusion on the intra-industry 
dispersion of plant average earnings in 1950s Britain, a finding that seems consistent 
with the mechanism I have described above to interpret the strong positive effect of the 
abolition of the British cartels on industrial disputes. A potential concern is that my data 
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set includes a number of industries fully or mostly under public ownership and subject 
to centralised industry-level bargaining, and for these industries the mechanism 
proposed here might not apply. However, I have shown that my results also hold for the 
manufacturing sub-sample, which only includes industries fully or mostly under private 
ownership and subject to an informal but effective system of bargaining at plant level 
that operated alongside centralised bargaining during the period under study. 
Furthermore, the industries which were under public ownership were not affected by the 
breakdown of cartels, so they do not influence the estimated effect of competition in my 
regressions using the full sample other than as part of the control group.  
In previous research (Symeonidis 2000, 2002) I have shown that cartel policy in 
the UK caused a substantial restructuring of previously collusive industries through 
mergers and exit of firms, and that this process went on for more than a decade. It seems 
that firm-union bargaining became more difficult in these times of increased uncertainty 
and remained so in the long run, leading to a permanent rise in industrial action in 
previously collusive industries, at least until other factors – including macroeconomic, 
labour market, legislative and institutional changes in the 1980s and 1990s – caused a 
sharp decline of all industrial conflict in Britain. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for STRIKES and DAYS. 
 
 
STRIKES 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
1949-1953 
(n = 250) 
 
1954-1958 
(n = 250) 
 
1959-1964 
(n = 300) 
 
1965-1970 
(n = 300) 
 
1971-1975 
(n = 250) 
 
 
6.16 
 
 
8.65 
 
 
10.68 
 
 
15.49 
 
 
17.30 
 
2.09 
 
 
1.80 
 
 
4.18 
 
 
7.48 
 
 
10.67 
 
19.25 
 
 
34.40 
 
 
28.04 
 
 
28.41 
 
 
22.44 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
164.4 
 
 
280.8 
 
 
238.8 
 
 
305.4 
 
 
169.0 
 
 
DAYS 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
 
Minimum 
 
 
Maximum 
 
1949-1953 
(n = 250) 
 
1954-1958 
(n = 250) 
 
1959-1964 
(n = 300) 
 
1965-1970 
(n = 300) 
 
1971-1975 
(n = 250) 
 
98.05 
 
 
223.04 
 
 
187.79 
 
 
325.26 
 
 
778.25 
 
12.49 
 
 
12.73 
 
 
25.51 
 
 
68.55 
 
 
158.92 
 
306.45 
 
 
800.47 
 
 
605.60 
 
 
857.79 
 
 
2593.76 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
3123.8 
 
 
7411.6 
 
 
8760.9 
 
 
8854.2 
 
 
32721.2 
      
Note: n denotes the number of observations (industry-year pairs). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for STRIKES and DAYS (manufacturing sub-sample). 
 
 
STRIKES 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
1949-1953 
(n = 170) 
 
1954-1958 
(n = 170) 
 
1959-1964 
(n = 204) 
 
1965-1970 
(n = 204) 
 
1971-1975 
(n = 170) 
 
 
3.58 
 
 
3.45 
 
 
6.88 
 
 
13.36 
 
 
16.62 
 
2.54 
 
 
2.10 
 
 
4.59 
 
 
9.14 
 
 
14.32 
 
4.26 
 
 
4.82 
 
 
7.22 
 
 
13.81 
 
 
11.92 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
34.6 
 
 
32.0 
 
 
42.1 
 
 
67.9 
 
 
59.8 
 
 
DAYS 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
 
Standard 
deviation 
 
 
 
Minimum 
 
 
Maximum 
 
1949-1953 
(n = 170) 
 
1954-1958 
(n = 170) 
 
1959-1964 
(n = 204) 
 
1965-1970 
(n = 204) 
 
1971-1975 
(n = 170) 
 
71.02 
 
 
153.52 
 
 
203.66 
 
 
267.62 
 
 
622.17 
 
13.69 
 
 
14.30 
 
 
35.30 
 
 
78.73 
 
 
215.03 
 
158.24 
 
 
629.45 
 
 
689.20 
 
 
524.07 
 
 
927.33 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
1190.2 
 
 
7411.6 
 
 
8760.9 
 
 
4429.4 
 
 
5781.9 
      
Note: n denotes the number of observations (industry-year pairs). 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficients between CHANGE, lnSTRIKES and lnDAYS. 
 
  
Correlation 
coefficient 
between 
CHANGE and 
lnSTRIKES 
 
Correlation 
coefficient 
between 
CHANGE and 
lnDAYS 
 
Correlation 
coefficient 
between 
lnSTRIKES and 
lnDAYS 
 
Full sample 
 
1949-1953 
(n = 216) 
 
1954-1958 
(n = 218) 
 
1959-1964 
(n = 280) 
 
1965-1970 
(n = 285) 
 
1971-1975 
(n = 249) 
 
 
Manufacturing 
sub-sample 
 
1949-1953 
(n = 146) 
 
1954-1958 
(n = 146) 
 
1959-1964 
(n = 189) 
 
1965-1970 
(n = 191) 
 
1971-1975 
(n = 169) 
 
 
 
 
−0.014 
 
 
−0.061 
 
 
0.098 
 
 
0.143 
 
 
0.215 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.141 
 
 
−0.220 
 
 
−0.079 
 
 
0.008 
 
 
0.060 
 
 
 
−0.149 
 
 
−0.101 
 
 
0.068 
 
 
0.071 
 
 
0.131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.263 
 
 
−0.191 
 
 
−0.029 
 
 
0.088 
 
 
−0.016 
 
 
 
0.747 
 
 
0.749 
 
 
0.792 
 
 
0.795 
 
 
0.782 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.688 
 
 
0.665 
 
 
0.737 
 
 
0.860 
 
 
0.717 
    
Note: n denotes the number of observations (industry-year pairs). 
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Table 4. Regression results for the number of stoppages per 100,000 employees. 
   Dependent variable:  
lnSTRIKES 
Dependent variable: 
root3STRIKES 
UNION 1.315 
(1.78) 
1.049 
(2.08) 
1.242 
(1.66) 
0.608 
(0.51) 
0.453 
(0.39) 
1.370 
(1.93) 
 0.795 
(1.14) 
0.620 
(1.63) 
0.729 
(1.02) 
lnEMPLOYEES 0.362 
(1.36) 
0.206 
(1.48) 
0.369 
(1.36) 
0.206 
(0.58) 
0.234 
(0.69) 
0.253 
(1.09) 
 0.259 
(1.13) 
0.300 
(2.72) 
0.245 
(1.14) 
UNEMPLOYMENT −8.753 
(−1.31) 
−4.815 
(−1.68) 
−8.716 
(−1.30) 
2.522 
(0.42) 
3.056 
(0.52) 
−1.271 
(−0.28) 
 −7.512 
(−1.09) 
−3.882 
(−1.74) 
−7.499 
(−1.08) 
CHANGE4953 - - 0.348 
(1.26) 
0.407 
(1.46) 
0.416 
(1.48) 
-  - - 0.311 
(1.93) 
CHANGE5964 0.517 
(2.31) 
0.561 
(2.64) 
0.689 
(2.94) 
0.613 
(1.73) 
0.619 
(1.72) 
0.533 
(2.32) 
 0.383 
(2.15) 
0.431 
(2.73) 
0.536 
(2.97) 
CHANGE6570 0.494 
(1.82) 
0.464 
(2.08) 
0.668 
(2.20) 
0.857 
(2.06) 
0.866 
(2.08) 
0.421 
(1.71) 
 0.401 
(1.60) 
0.503 
(3.02) 
0.556 
(2.17) 
CHANGE7176 0.761 
(2.45) 
0.656 
(2.72) 
0.939 
(2.79) 
0.933 
(1.98) 
0.979 
(2.01) 
0.605 
(2.17) 
 0.754 
(2.71) 
0.703 
(3.93) 
0.913 
(3.16) 
PROFIT - - - 0.129 
(0.16) 
0.218 
(0.27) 
-  - - - 
IMPORT - - - - 0.597 
(0.77) 
-  - - - 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.634 0.455 0.635 0.679 0.680 0.657  0.525 0.360 0.527 
R2LSDV 0.882 - 0.882 0.816 0.817 0.868  0.846 - 0.847 
Hausman statistic 
Prob-value 
70.60 
0.000 
- 71.34 
0.000 
33.76 
0.013 
36.39 
0.009 
72.55 
0.000 
 9.42 
0.051 
- 9.73 
0.045 
Wooldridge test 
Prob-value 
5.36 
0.025 
- 5.05 
0.029 
2.34 
0.144 
2.91 
0.148 
4.10 
0.048 
 4.63 
0.036 
- 4.36 
0.042 
AR(1) - 0.39 - - - -  - 0.39 - 
No. of industries 
No. of 
observations 
50 
1248 
50 
1198 
50 
1248 
34 
841 
34 
841 
48 
1194 
 50 
1350 
50 
1300 
50 
1350 
Notes: Columns 1, 3-6, 7 and 9: fixed effects estimation, t-statistics based on cluster-robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Columns 2 and 8: fixed effects estimation with AR(1) 
disturbances, t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Regression results for working days lost per 1000 employees. 
   Dependent variable:  
lnDAYS 
Dependent variable: 
root3DAYS 
UNION 2.933 
(3.00) 
2.992 
(3.02) 
2.334 
(1.49) 
2.178 
(1.98) 
2.136 
(1.93) 
2.988 
(2.84) 
 5.768 
(3.05) 
5.711 
(3.01) 
5.190 
(3.83) 
lnEMPLOYEES 0.528 
(1.18) 
0.522 
(1.17) 
−0.022 
(−0.05) 
0.289 
(1.10) 
0.289 
(1.10) 
0.470 
(1.03) 
 0.364 
(0.59) 
0.367 
(0.59) 
0.215 
(0.66) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.386 
(0.06) 
0.355 
(0.06) 
5.600 
(0.64) 
10.07 
(1.40) 
10.27 
(1.44) 
1.758 
(0.25) 
 18.08 
(1.47) 
18.09 
(1.47) 
18.50 
(1.47) 
CHANGE4953 - −0.282 
(−0.64) 
- - - -  - 0.270 
(0.44) 
0.280 
(0.53) 
CHANGE5964 1.392 
(3.78) 
1.253 
(3.03) 
1.636 
(3.96) 
1.387 
(3.42) 
1.392 
(3.43) 
1.363 
(3.52) 
 2.059 
(4.86) 
2.191 
(3.82) 
2.178 
(4.12) 
CHANGE6570 1.124 
(2.11) 
0.983 
(1.77) 
2.376 
(3.88) 
2.112 
(3.80) 
2.120 
(3.82) 
1.070 
(1.96) 
 1.438 
(2.39) 
1.573 
(2.58) 
1.588 
(2.65) 
CHANGE7176 1.466 
(2.52) 
1.321 
(2.11) 
1.466 
(2.28) 
1.200 
(2.09) 
1.228 
(2.12) 
1.388 
(2.29) 
 1.600 
(1.66) 
1.740 
(1.72) 
1.767 
(1.70) 
PROFIT - - 1.607 
(1.01) 
1.097 
(0.72) 
1.200 
(0.79) 
-  - - - 
IMPORT - - - - 0.421 
(0.49) 
-  - - - 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.375 0.375 0.480 0.479 0.480 0.379  0.333 0.333 0.333 
R2LSDV 0.676 0.676 0.686 - - 0.649  0.651 0.651 - 
Hausman statistic 
Prob-value 
30.48 
0.046 
31.14 
0.053 
25.44 
0.147 
25.44 
0.147 
24.79 
0.168 
26.30 
0.122 
 1.67 
0.796 
1.65 
0.800 
1.65 
0.800 
Wooldridge test 
Prob-value 
1.82 
0.183 
1.67 
0.202 
0.97 
0.333 
- - 3.15 
0.082 
 0.94 
0.337 
0.99 
0.324 
- 
No. of industries 
No. of 
observations 
50 
1248 
50 
1248 
34 
841 
34 
841 
34 
841 
48 
1194 
 50 
1350 
50 
1350 
50 
1350 
Notes: Columns 1-3, 6 and 7-8: fixed effects estimation. Columns 4-5 and 9: random effects 
estimation. All columns: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 6. Further robustness checks. 
  Dependent variable: 
lnSTRIKES 
Dependent variable: 
lnDAYS 
UNION 1.917 
(2.58) 
2.004 
(1.65) 
1.409 
(1.24) 
 3.963 
(4.56) 
4.359 
(3.07) 
3.551 
(3.33) 
lnEMPLOYEES 0.261 
(0.99) 
0.088 
(0.31) 
0.147 
(0.49) 
 0.443 
(1.06) 
0.037 
(0.09) 
0.238 
(0.94) 
UNEMPLOYMENT −5.748 
(−1.40) 
3.548 
(0.92) 
1.976 
(0.52) 
 4.329 
(0.85) 
15.81 
(2.37) 
17.65 
(3.07) 
CHANGE4953 - - 0.973 
(4.74) 
 - - - 
CHANGE5964 0.561 
(3.03) 
0.610 
(2.64) 
0.898 
(3.96) 
 0.892 
(2.84) 
1.209 
(3.47) 
1.039 
(2.97) 
CHANGE6570 0.968 
(4.11) 
1.127 
(3.42) 
1.364 
(4.16) 
 1.216 
(2.72) 
1.659 
(3.36) 
1.497 
(3.17) 
CHANGE7176 0.721 
(2.38) 
0.618 
(1.34) 
1.032 
(2.27) 
 1.250 
(2.18) 
1.068 
(1.53) 
1.024 
(1.63) 
PROFIT - 1.207 
(2.00) 
0.847 
(1.41) 
 - 3.309 
(2.81) 
2.868 
(2.43) 
IMPORT - 0.687 
(1.01) 
0.702 
(0.99) 
 - 0.926 
(0.95) 
0.734 
(0.87) 
INFLATION 0.684 
(1.33) 
0.286 
(0.37) 
−0.235 
(−0.31) 
 2.340 
(2.79) 
2.278 
(2.14) 
2.620 
(2.80) 
Time dummies No No No  No No No 
TREND 0.063 
(11.67) 
0.060 
(7.19) 
0.069 
(7.35) 
 0.067 
(6.15) 
0.067 
(4.60) 
0.069 
(4.78) 
R2 0.553 0.611 0.628  0.311 0.408 0.407 
R2LSDV 0.856 0.777 0.787  0.642 0.643 - 
Hausman statistic 
Prob-value 
24.43 
0.001 
16.40 
0.059 
18.09 
0.053 
 11.54 
0.116 
13.43 
0.144 
13.43 
0.144 
No. of industries 
No. of observations 
50 
1248 
34 
841 
34 
841 
50 
1248 
34 
841 
34 
841 
Notes: Columns 1-3 and 4-5: fixed effects estimation. Column 6: random effects estimation. 
All columns: t-statistics based on cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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APPENDIX 
 
As pointed out in the text, the competition variable CHANGE takes values between 0 
and 1 according to the fraction of each industry which was affected by the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act. I illustrate here the construction of CHANGE from the 
primary information on collusive agreements by way of two examples. Both are 
manufacturing industries, as most non-manufacturing industries were not significantly 
affected by the 1956 cartel law, and both contain a variety of types of agreements and 
involve the use of several sources of information. A detailed survey of restrictive 
agreements across all British manufacturing industries from the early 1950s to the mid-
1970s can be found in Symeonidis (2002).  
 
Bread, flour confectionery and biscuits 
The three products of this industry are bread, accounting for about 40% of total industry 
sales revenue in the late 1950s and early 1960s according to detailed product-level data 
from the 1958 and 1963 Censuses of Production; flour confectionery, covering another 
30% of total industry sales; and biscuits. The price of bread was under government 
control until the mid-1950s. It then became subject to various agreements by national, 
regional and local associations. The most important ones were a pricing agreement by 
the Federation of Wholesale and Multiple Bakers, whose members were “plant bakers” 
in England and Wales, and price agreements by the Wholesale and Retail Bakers of 
Scotland Association, the Scottish Association of Master Bakers, and a Joint Costing 
Committee of the two associations. All these were formally abandoned in 1959-1960. A 
range of regional agreements, as well as several others by various associations of 
“master bakers” and numerous local collusive arrangements, also ended at that time. 
Swann et al. (1973) describe the gradual emergence of competition in the bread 
industry, despite parallel pricing and information agreements about discounts, which 
ended in 1965. Further information is contained in MMC, Flour and Bread (H.M.S.O., 
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1977). A large number of restrictive arrangements among producers were in operation 
in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Most of them involved the exchange of information 
about discounts to particular buyers or about intended increases in discounts. Some 
were national, but most were local. All of them were abandoned in the mid-1970s. 
However, it is very doubtful that these arrangements had any significant effect on 
competition. The view of the MMC was that they were an attempt, largely unsuccessful, 
to resist pressure from retailers for progressively larger discounts. In fact, discounts kept 
rising between 1965 and 1975, which suggests that competition was largely effective. 
Flour confectionery was not subject to any national agreements. However, some 
of the regional or local pricing arrangements among bakers covered flour confectionery 
as well, although most did not. A plausible estimate is that as much as a third of the 
flour confectionery industry was affected by the 1956 law. Finally, in biscuits an 
agreement by the National Association of Biscuit Manufacturers provided for prices, 
conditions of sale and restrictions on sales promotion, and was cancelled in 1959. 
Chocolate biscuits were also covered by agreements among chocolate confectionery 
manufacturers, which ended in the early 1960s. The biscuit industry was also subject to 
collective discrimination arrangements before 1956. Cereal filling, a secondary product 
of the industry, was subject to a pricing agreement, which was operated by the Rusk 
Manufacturers Association and was abandoned in 1960.  
In summary, about 80% of the bread, flour confectionery and biscuit industry 
was subject to collusion in the 1950s and later became competitive, hence CHANGE 
takes the value 0.8. 
 
Pharmaceutical and toilet preparations 
This industry includes three product categories: pharmaceutical chemicals, accounting 
for about 15% of total industry sales revenue in the late 1950s and early 1960s; 
pharmaceutical preparations, covering another 55% of sales revenue; and toilet 
preparations. A restrictive agreement between two producers of insulin, providing for 
40 
 
co-operation in production and for the joint sale of insulin, was cancelled in 1961. See 
also MRPC, Report on the Supply of Insulin (H.M.S.O., 1952). Insulin is a very small 
part of the industry, however. An agreement of the Chemists Federation was referred to 
the Restrictive Practices Court, contested by the parties but nevertheless condemned by 
the Court in late 1958. The membership of the Federation consisted of manufacturers of 
proprietary medicines, wholesale chemists and retail chemists. The Federation imposed 
restrictions designed to prevent the sale to the public by anyone except retail chemists 
(whether or not members) of proprietary medicines manufactured by members. 
Although this arrangement restricted competition among distributors, it is not clear why 
it should have had a significant effect on competition among producers. The same 
remark can be made about the activities of the Proprietary Articles Trade Association, 
whose membership consisted of manufacturers and distributors of medicines and 
toiletries: the Association collectively enforced resale prices and set minimum 
distributors’ margins until 1956, but it did not regulate the manufacturers’ individual 
prices. An agreement of the Proprietary Association of Great Britain, which remained in 
force throughout the period examined here, related only to a Code of Conduct. A pricing 
agreement between three UK and several foreign manufacturers of quinine and 
quinidine, which ended in 1963, covered a very specific product and was of little 
importance for the industry as a whole. 
In contrast, an agreement by the Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry, which ended in 1960, contained recommended prices for non-proprietary 
medicines for the home retail and hospital trade. The agreement did not affect branded 
proprietary drugs or export sales. According to a case study of the industry, written by 
C.J. Thomas and published in Burn (1958), roughly a third of total sales of 
pharmaceuticals in the mid-1950s were export sales; another third were home sales of 
branded and unbranded drugs through the National Health Service (either to hospitals or 
supplied on prescription), and about 70% of those were sales of branded drugs; and 
another third were publicly advertised proprietary medicines, drugs sold without 
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prescription, and veterinary and horticultural medicines. These figures suggest that sales 
of unbranded drugs in the home market, either through the NHS or without prescription, 
did not account for more than 10-15% of total sales of pharmaceutical preparations in 
the mid-1950s, and they probably accounted for less than 10% in the 1960s.  
Finally, an agreement by the Hairdressing Manufacturers and Wholesalers 
Association specified conditions of sale and minimum trade discounts for hairdressers’ 
articles. Most of the restrictions were abandoned in 1959. This association was also 
responsible for the collective enforcement of manufacturers’ individual resale prices 
until 1956. Similarly, the Proprietary Articles Trade Association enforced resale prices 
and set minimum distributors’ margins for other toilet preparations until 1956. Although 
competition among distributors was certainly regulated by these arrangements, 
competition among manufacturers of toilet preparations was not.  
In summary, about 10% of the pharmaceutical and toilet preparations industry 
experienced a change of competition regime, so CHANGE takes the value 0.1.  
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